Accurate information sources are vital prerequisites for good decision making. Here, we consider a multiple participant setting, where all decision makers have a collection of neighbours with whom they share their beliefs about some common relevant uncertain quantity. When determining which course of action to follow, a decision maker takes into account all the information received from her neighbours. Over time, in light of the returns observed from choices made, decision makers update their own beliefs over the uncertain event and also adjust the degree of consideration they afford to the opinions of each neighbour based on the level of reliability their information is ascertained to have. In this article, we derive and discuss a methodology, the plug-in approach, by which this can be done, and discuss some suitable justification for this. We include an illustrative risk-based example which further demonstrates the merits of the method, before concluding with a discussion on further work and potential alternatives.
Introduction
Consider a decision-making problem entailing multiple imperfect decision makers (DMs), that is, individuals who possess uncertainty in their view of the world. Using the terminology of Karny and Guy, 1 the 'neighbours' of a DM are the collection of other participants with whom she has a common area of interest. Neighbours will frequently have different degrees of knowledge about the uncertain event of interest, and hence may have greatly differing beliefs over what outcome may obtain from a particular decision. Not only this, but also they will commonly have varying degrees of conviction in the belief they hold, for example, two neighbours could both predict that the same outcome will occur, but one could be almost certain of this, while the other could be deeply unsure. It seems a logical concept that in order to maximise the decision quality (and indeed to minimise the associated risk) of DMs within the group, it is imperative to maximise the amount of information which they have access to prior to making their decision, or, to quote Bunn 2 'the methodology of combining forecasts is founded upon the axiom of maximal information usage'. It stands to reason that a DM well informed about the topic at hand will generally make more astute decisions than one who is not. One would expect this more astute decision making to lead to a corresponding increase in the utility that the DM associates with the outcome which occurs as a result, that is, an increased decision quality. Within this framework, the rational course of action seems to be for DMs to share their beliefs with each other, incorporating a greater scope of knowledge into their individual decision-making task. We assume DMs are non-competing and have no reason to supply each other with intentionally inaccurate beliefs, that is, there is no motivation for dishonesty among participants. They all make their own decisions, the consequences of which will impact solely upon themselves. Hence, there is no incentive for a DM to purposely supply a misrepresented version of her opinion to a neighbour (in the hope that the decision made by that neighbour will maximise the DM's utility function, and hence benefit her more than the genuine version of her opinion might have). We also stress that while the approach outlined in this article is applicable in a group decision-making framework, where a common decision must be made by all the members of the group, below it is commonly considered that all individuals have their own tasks to carry out, and simply wish to have access to as much prudent information to assist them with conducting these as possible.
DMs will note over time that some neighbours are more accurate sources of information than others. The seemingly logical reaction upon this realisation, is to pay more heed to views proffered by neighbours deemed reliable, and to somewhat disregard those views of those who are not. Intuitively, this should lead to an increased decision quality, as decisions are now made using information sources that are believed to be trustworthy, and indeed have shown themselves to be so in the past.
Much consideration has been given to the problem of combining judgments of domain-specific experts into a single belief to be used by a DM in a decision-making problem, for instance Cooke 3, 4 and Clemen and Winkler 5 among others. Our problem approaches this technique from a different perspective, with each individual herself being considered an expert, who must combine her belief with those of other experts, in order to make her own decision. Nevertheless, the following discussion, which takes place in the setting of the former, is equally applicable to the latter.
Perhaps, the most obvious initial question is how should beliefs be represented? The language of probability seems the obvious choice by which individuals can express uncertainty about unknown quantities, for instance using a fully parameterised probability distribution. A simplified alternative proposal is the Bayes linear method, derived in Goldstein 6 and Goldstein and Wooff, 7 in which an individual states only the first two moments (the mean, variance and potential covariances) of their belief. This method is applied in an opinion pooling framework by Wisse et al., 8 while Quigley et al. 9 demonstrate how the Bayes linear method can be used to estimate correlation in a setting with an underlying Poisson process. Randell et al. 10 discuss application of this method to the inspection of large-scale physical systems. However, it is commonly regarded that specification of a full probability distribution over uncertain events is possible, as discussed, for instance, in French. 11 In what follows, we assume a DM can either construct this probability distribution herself or can have it provided via elicitation methods (e.g. those discussed in O'Hagan 12 ) if she herself is not statistically literate.
There are two primary opinion pooling methods: mathematically and behaviourally. The former involves a mathematical function, taking as inputs the various beliefs of individuals and returning a single belief, which in some sense represents collective opinion. The latter is more heuristic, with individuals discussing their opinions together, in an effort to reach some class of consensus. While several behavioural procedures have been developed, notably the Delphi method of Dalkey 13 and the nominal group technique of Delbecq et al., 14 these suffer from a lack of rigour in application and can be seen as somewhat ad hoc approaches.
Within mathematical combining, there are two dominant methods, namely Bayesian and linear pooling. A definitive guide to the nuances of both of these is provided in Genest and Zidek, 15 which we recommend to the interested reader. Of the two, Bayesian pooling is the more complex, with a DM first specifying her own prior distribution over the uncertain quantities of interest, before viewing the opinions of experts as data, which are entered into a likelihood function, and combined with the prior to yield a posterior distribution. French 11 comments favourably on the concept of expert beliefs as data, but concedes that this method has vast problems with implementation, not least in the need for the choice of an appropriate likelihood function, with Clemen and Winkler 5 noting that 'at the same time it is compelling, the Bayesian approach is also frustratingly difficult to apply'. While Clemen and Winker 5 propose some suggested forms of likelihood functions for specific problems, no generalised method of supplying this function has been found. In Lindley and Singpurwalla, 16 it is illustrated how, in a oneperiod problem, such a Bayesian approach is technically possible, but requires DMs to specify a vast amount of parameters (pertaining, for instance, to correlation and overconfidence of neighbours), which may be beyond the scope of individuals in a realistic application. A copula method is used by Jouini and Clemen 17 to model the dependency between individuals and sidestep the difficulties with providing a likelihood function, but this still places a large implementation burden on the user in supplying measures of dependence between different individuals. Linear pooling is a more straightforward methodology, in which opinions can be combined in a variety of manners, most commonly arithmetically, but also harmonically 18 or geometrically/logarithmically. 19, 20 A detailed discussion occurs in Genest and Zidek 15 on the merits of the various possibilities, and, in what follows, we choose to use arithmetic opinion pooling for its relative simplicity, ease of interpretation and in sticking with common practice.
The next problem arises with the choosing of the weights for this linear combination. Ideally, these would reflect reliability, with high weights given to those individuals who were deemed trustworthy, and lower weights given to those deemed inaccurate. In Cooke's classical method, 3 seed variables are used as a method of assessing expert accuracy before a decision needs to be made, with experts asked to give their opinions on quantities whose exact values are unknown to them, but known to the DM. A collection of data sets are used in Cooke and Goossens 21 to compare the performance of the classical method to some alternatives (most prominently the simple scheme of equal weights) under varying conditions and provided some justification for the use of the approach. The work of Clemen 22 identified some potential problems with the validation method used in this justification and demonstrated (for a subset of the data used by Cooke and Goosens 21 ) that it was not conclusive if the classical method outperformed the equal weights approach or not, noting that 'it has been somewhat frustrating to consistently find the simple average performing so well empirically'. A study carried out by Eggstaff et al. 23 using the complete data and successfully showed the merits of the classical approach, as well as demonstrating some interesting results about the optimal number of seed variables to be considered in a particular problem. A treatment of the conceivable shortcomings of this classical approach, and some potential other methods to be used in its stead, takes place in Flandoli et al. 24 A discussion occurs in DeGroot and Mortera 25 how weights can be chosen which meet some optimal criteria, but this is in a setting where all DMs must have common prior distributions and utility functions, which is not the situation we consider (and indeed is not a situation which it is easy to conceive of occurring in a realistic situation). In the absence of access to seed variables and other relevant information prior to decision making, the Laplacian Principle of Indifference 26 is often applied, giving all individuals equal weight initially, in the absence of any significant evidence to favour one over another. We briefly comment that Eggstaff et al. 27 discuss a novel application for the classical approach of Cooke 3 to assess technical performance in an engineering context. In a setting where no relevant seed variables can be considered (i.e. a unique problem with no appropriate comparisons available), they augment the traditional method to allow for dynamic updating, with previously witnessed values considered as seeds (once a sufficiently large amount of these have been observed, with equal weights used up to this point). This scheme allows for sequential weight updating.
Reference is made in Karny and Guy 1 to combining beliefs in the framework which we have referenced above, where each DM is considered as an expert themselves, and can combine her opinions with those of neighbours in an attempt to increase her own decision quality. In the most simplistic setting, there are two DMs, labelled P 1 and P 2 , who are interested in some uncertain quantity u, which they have probabilistic beliefs over, given by f 1 (u) and f 2 (u), respectively. Karny and Guy 1 advocate that combined beliefs should be given bŷ
Here, a i is the weight given by P i to her own belief, with 04a i 41 for i = 1, 2. However, no explanation is provided as to how an individual may choose the weights she allocates, or more importantly, how these weights may be updated over time. Karny and Guy 1 discuss how this method can potentially be extended to a setting with more than two participants in a pairwise iterative manner. However, this method is not invariant to the order in which sharing takes place, as the beliefs shared between neighbours are functions (weighted sums) of the beliefs of themselves and all the neighbours they have previously shared with.
In the remainder of this article, we generalise the work of Karny and Guy 1 to a setting with n participants, while proposing a methodology to attempt to solve the problem discussed above, of attaching appropriate weights to the opinions of each individual, which are a reflection of their relative reliability. The major contribution of this work, occurring in 'PI method', can be seen as providing a non-arbitrary method of assessing the accuracy of neighbours and in turn supplying appropriate weights to an additive linear opinion pool, which should increase decision quality of users.
The work presented within this article is highly applicable to a wide range of realistic problems across a broad spectrum of fields pertaining to risk. A group of computer programmers may wish to pool their beliefs about the average number of bugs occurring per one thousand lines of codes, to aid their individual decisions on whether to release their software or to continue testing it. 28 Several engineers may wish to exchange their opinions on the failure rate of a particular component that is prevalent in all of their respective systems, in order to determine the optimal time to replace these components, for instance in a setting where it is expensive for the system as a whole to fail, but there is also a lesser cost associated with replacing components. 29 Nuclear power stations may wish to confer between each other as to the perceived risk of a fault occurring so as to decide whether additional safety devices need to be installed. 30 Medical practitioners may seek the opinion of peers as to the probability of a diagnosis being correct given some symptoms witnessed (and other similar problems, for example those considered in Cox 31 ). The example that we consider in section 'Example' involves a collection of stockbrokers who want to communicate among each other in order to determine the behaviour of a stock price over time and is chosen to illustrate our approach as there is a clear connection between opinions, returns and the utility functions of DMs in this instance. Clearly, there are multiple potential implementations of the approach derived here. In each case, there is clearly a risk present that the individuals and groups wish to avoid, be it a loss of financial wealth, national safety or medical health. Note that in the situations outlined above, each individual entity (be it one person or be it a company) will have their own personal utility function over potential outcomes, so, even if decisions are made using common beliefs, different decisions may well be deemed optimal by different entities.
In section 'PI method' we introduce and discuss the plug-in (PI) approach, which is a method by which individuals can learn over time about the reliability of their information sources, and increase their understanding about a pertinent quantity of interest in the hope of increasing their decision quality. We provide some justifications for the use of this approach in section 'Justification'. We include an illustrative example in section 'Example' to show how this technique is applicable in a realistic situation, and how it may increase decision calibre for users. In section 'Possible alternatives' we discuss some potential alternative methods that could be used for a problem of this nature, before concluding in section 'Conclusion and further work' with some ideas for future work and further research.
PI method
Consider a setting entailing n DMs, denoted P 1 , . . . , P n , with n52. There is some uncertain quantity of interest, u, which each participant P i has their own probability distribution, f i (u), over. In what follows, we assume u is static, that is, it does not change over time in a dynamic fashion, instead remaining constant (and unknown). Each DM is willing to listen to the beliefs of her neighbours and constructs a weighted arithmetic linear combination of the following form
Here, a i, j is the weight given by P i to P j , with a i, j 50 for all i, j = 1, . . . , n and P n j = 1 a i, j = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n, that is, weights are non-negative and sum to one, making interpretation straightforward. Hence, the opinion given in equation (3) takes the form of a mixture model, in this case a convex combination of distributions which take the same functional form (but with differing parameter values). Below we discuss a method by which these weights may be attained as an accurate reflection of the predictive ability of neighbours, in an attempt to ensure a higher decision quality for DMs. In the framework, we develop each individual updates her own probability distribution in light of the return r observed as a result of the decision made at the previous epoch, in the standard Bayesian manner, that is
In what follows, for simplicity, we assume all individuals observe a common return. There are cases where this assumption is reasonable, for example, where the return witnessed is the value of a stock, which will be the same for all DMs involved in the process. Yet, there may be cases where all DMs are interested in the same parameter, but observe different noisy realisations of this, for example, if u was the failure rate of a particular type of component, and different individuals witnessed different components of this type, and the respective differing times of failure. Some straightforward modifications of the approach outlined here enable it to be implemented in this more general setting. This allowance of multiple differing returns being simultaneously witnessed and incorporated into the process further differentiates this methodology from the setting of a single DM seeking the opinion of a collection of (nondecision-making) experts. This is because the decision made by individuals will impact upon the information which they witness, and hence the combined belief of all DMs with whom they are neighbours.
The posterior distribution at one epoch will become the prior distribution at the next. For mathematical convenience and elucidation, beliefs over f i (u) may be of a form such that conjugacy can be applied, ensuring tractability and ease of calculations (although it is by no means a necessity, with methods such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo 32 being implementable in cases of intractability). Updating is performed upon individual rather than combined beliefs to ensure individuals are always able to extract their own personal belief from the linear combination. We distinguish between f i (u) andf i (u); the former reflects the personal probabilistic beliefs of P i , while the latter is a tool she uses in her decision making, given that she is willing to pay some heed to the beliefs of others in the hope of increasing her decision quality.
We consider the method of decision making used by all individuals to be that of maximising expected utility. This idea dates back as far as Bernoulli 33 and was given a formal axiomatic treatment by Von Neumann and Morgernstern. 34 Hence, if a DM agrees with a set of four axioms (namely completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence), then the optimal decision for her is that maximising expected utility. We assume DMs concur with these axioms, and hence choose their decision, d Ã , such that
For P i , this is a function of her amalgamated belief, f i (u), and her subjective utility function u i (r). DMs are explicitly taking the beliefs of neighbours into account in their decision-making process usingf i (u), rather than f i (u), in equation (5) . For notational ease, we use the same symbol u i for u i (d i , u)[u i (r) and u i (d) and presume it is evident what is meant by the context it appears in. In equation (5), above we use integration to determine expected utilities, which is appropriate if the returns to be witnessed are continuous (e.g. profit/loss from an investment or a temperature). This should be replaced by summation if returns are discrete, for example, in a wager where a DM will either gain 5 pounds or 5 pounds. Continuous returns are generally aligned with continuous probability distributions, with discrete distributions for discrete returns. We also assume that DMs are able to specify utility functions over potential outcomes. A method by which these preferences could be ascertained over time is adaptive utility, discussed in, for example, Cyert and DeGroot 35 and Houlding and Coolen 36, 37 and modified to incorporate extreme vagueness in the priors over preferences in Houlding and Coolen. 38 Note that even though common amalgamated distributions will be constructed by all DMs under the methodology outlined below, they may potentially make different decisions depending on what utility function they respectively supply in equation (5) , that is, if u i (r) is heavily risk prone and u j (r) is heavily risk averse, then the decisions made by P i and P j will likely be highly contrasting, even thougĥ f i (u)[f j (u) by the objectivity involved in our reweighting process.
In the PI approach, it is assumed that a priori, DMs have no knowledge about the accuracy of their neighbours as information sources so, as previously discussed, the process is initialised with the Principle of Indifference. Hence, at the first epoch, all DMs give the beliefs of their neighbours, as well as their own belief, an equal weight, that is, a i, j = 1=n for all i, j = 1, . . . , n. Equation (3) is rewritten aŝ
Having constructed this equally-weighted amalgamated belief, each individual P i now determines which decision is optimal for them using equation (5) . After the first decision is made, and some outcome is observed, the weighting based on the perceived reliability of DMs begins. We denote by r the return witnessed following a decision epoch. This is a realisation of the random variable R, which follows a distribution according to the true data generating mechanism, f(R = rju). We wish to find the probability density that each DM placed on the return that occurred prior to seeing it occur, that is, we want to 'PI' this value to their prior predictive distribution, giving us
We write w j to denote the PI weight of the jth individual. Clearly, a rational DM will want to give higher weights to neighbours with high PI weights than to those with low values. Given this, we propose the reweighting scheme in equation (8), whereby when determining the weight to assign a neighbour, a DM considers their most recent performance (indicated by their PI weight) and their past performances (inherent within their previous normalised weight). Generally, when a Ã i, j denotes the updated weight, a i, j is the previously associated weight, and w j is the most recent PI weight, we write
Note that a DMs weight can be written as proportional to their initial equal weight multiplied by the product of all their PI weights witnessed up to this point. Issues arise if all DMs have assigned a probability density of zero to the event that occurred, leading to division by zero in equation (8), an invalid operation. Allocating probability densities of zero is advocated against by Cromwell's Rule, 39 as it implies no amount of evidence will persuade the individual to change their mind. However, this problem will not often occur in practice; however, as in most DM distributions, there will always be a non-zero (if in some cases negligibly small) probability density of an event occurring.
Another argument for the functional form of reweighting scheme proposed in equation (8) is that it ensures updating of a combined belief is done in a manner adhering to the Bayesian paradigm, as illustrated in, for instance, Lee 40 in relation to a discussion on mixture distributions. Consider a case where a combined belief is written asf i (u), and then a return r is witnessed, with corresponding PI weights of w 1 , . . . , w n for the n DMs. The posterior distribution,f i (ujr), can be written aŝ
Hence we see that a strong proponent of the use of the reweighting scheme advocated in equation (8) is that it provides updating in a manner coherent within a Bayesian framework, and thus can be viewed as a natural choice in some sense (assuming one agrees with this paradigm). Another property arising from this result is exchangeability, implying that the PI method assigns identical weights irrespective of the order in which a set of t returns is witnessed, that is, a i, j is unchanged regardless of if r s 1 (1) , . . . , r s 1 (t) or r s 2 (1) , . . . , r s 2 (t) are witnessed, where s 1 and s 2 are distinct permutations of a common set of t returns. Gneiting and Raftery 41 discuss the concept of strictly proper scoring rules, which are methods of assessing the performance of predictions which return the highest possible value (i.e. indicate the greatest merit) when a prediction is equal to the realised value. In the work we consider the PI weight, given in equation (7), to be our scoring rule. A criticism levelled at this scoring rule is that it is 'not sensitive to distance, meaning that no credit is given for assigning probabilities to values near but not identical to the one materialising'. Yet in our setting, where individuals are constantly updating their distributions about u (and hence by association their predictive distribution) this is not as important an issue, as their distributions will shift accordingly over time in light of the new information witnessed.
Genest and McConway 42 provide discussion on a broad range of potential updating schemes, which we highly recommend to the interested reader. Among these schemes is one equivalent to that derived above, in which weights are updated in a Bayesian manner using prior predictive distributions. The context that we consider our approach in is slightly different to that of Genest and McConway 42 in that we permit all DMs to possess their own utility functions, make different decisions and hence potentially see different returns (which they shall return to the group) depending on their attitudes to risk and gambles. Nevertheless, the justifications provided below may be seen as advocations for the Bayesian methodology of Genest and McConway, 42 and equivalently, the attractive asymptotic properties which they derive are applicable to our own methodology.
This method appears promising, as theoretically the decision quality should substantially improve over time, as the relevant information that the decision is based upon becomes increasingly accurate. It also appears objectively fair to the DMs involved, as they are initially assumed to be equally reliable, and the increase/ decrease in the weight allocated to them is directly proportional to how accurate they have shown themselves to be. Also note that the PI approach takes the previous weight of a DM into account when determining her weight at the next epoch, as equation (8) is a function of the previously allocated weight. Hence, these methods incorporate both present (i.e. last realised) accuracy as well as all past performance history.
Justification
Heuristically, the PI approach appears to be an attractive methodology by which DMs can learn over time about the accuracy of their information sources, and hence give extra emphasis in their decision-making task to the opinions of those they believe to be reliable. In what follows, we attempt to provide a somewhat more rigorous advocation for the use of this technique. First, we comment on some attractive coherency properties which the PI approach obeys, before progressing to an in-depth case study which considers how the PI approach performs against a collection of alternatives.
Properties of the PI approach
The PI approach obeys the following four properties: Property 1: w j 50 for all j = 1, . . . , n, with w j = 0 if and only if f j (R = r) = 0. Property 2: If a i, j \ a i, k and w j \ w k then a Ã i, j \ a Ã i, k . Property 3: If a i, j = a i, k and w j = w k then a Ã i, j = a Ã i, k . Property 4: If a i, j \ a i, k and w j . w k , then any of the following may occur, depending on the initial differences between the weights, and the updated difference between the reliability measures:
We provide a brief interpretation of what these mean, and why they are desirable criteria for a weighting scheme to possess. Property 1 is relatively trivial, stating that the PI weight will always be non-negative and will only equal zero if a DM places no probability density on a (witnessed) outcome occurring. Property 2 states that if P k is considered more reliable than P j (based on their respective past performances), and then at the next epoch P k once again appears more reliable (i.e. has a larger PI weight) then P k will still be considered more reliable than P j . Property 3 is an equality version of this. Finally, Property 4 states that if P k is considered more reliable than P j , but that the beliefs of P j appear more accurate for the next epoch (i.e. she has a higher PI weight) then which DM is considered the most reliable after this is determined by the existing discrepancy between their weights, and the discrepancy between their PI weights. Proof of these properties is relatively trivial.
Simulation study
Here, we attempt to provide justification for the PI approach by considering its performance in contrast to that of a collection of rational alternatives, for various collections of simulated data. A commonly used benchmark in problems of this ilk is that of equal weights (EQ), that is, where the weights assigned to individuals remain constant over time, instead of augmenting in a dynamic fashion based upon their perceived accuracy. Weaknesses of this method are instantly evident, with those DMs with extremely concise and accurate beliefs being afforded the same merit as those with vague and wildly inaccurate beliefs. If a group comprises of more DMs of the latter type than the former, then this will lead to poor modelling of u, and potentially poor decision quality. However, as more returns are witnessed, individuals will become increasingly accurate information sources, and hence, an equally weight combination of these may yield good results. Another potential simple linear opinion pooling method is one whereby a dominating weight of one is afforded to the DM who was more reliable (i.e. produced the largest PI weight) at the last epoch, with a weight of zero assigned to all other DMs we term this the Most Reliable, or MR, approach. Again there are obvious shortcomings to this method. If the outcome witnessed is an extremely unlikely one, with the DM deemed most reliable having a distribution actually severely contrasting to the true state of nature, then decision quality may be poor at the next epoch with only her (inaccurate) opinion taken into account. It is true that using the PI approach she would have been afforded a large PI weight, but the opinions of all other DMs would be factored in also, and her past inaccuracy would lead to a considerable decrease in her overall weight. Nevertheless, we may think of situations where this approach could be meritorious, for example, if a group contains one very accurate DM with the rest being very inaccurate, or if enough epochs have passed, so that all DMs are significantly accurate.
In our study, we consider three commonly used conjugate distributional assumptions, namely Beta-Binomial conjugacy, Normal-Normal conjugacy and Gamma-Poisson conjugacy, with the former, for instance, implying the combination of a beta prior distribution with a binomial data generating mechanism. For each of these three conjugate cases we considered situations where the DMs on average overestimated u, underestimated u, and had mean predictions centred on u. The parameterisations are included in Table 1 . Note in the underestimation cases, we allow the average prediction of DMs to be closer to the true parameter value than in the overestimation case to investigate whether this impacts upon performance. The number of DMs inherent within a particular case increases from 2 to 20, and the number of returns witnessed increases from 1 to 12. For each of these 228 (i.e. 19 3 12) cases, we carry out 5000 simulations of the process, recording which of the three linear opinion pooling techniques is superior for each of these simulations, and aggregating these figures across the 5000 simulations. Whichever method has the highest success proportion is deemed to be the optimal one for that particular case. This leads to the issue of determining what metric to use to determine which probability distribution is superior for a particular simulation. To infer this, we consider the posterior distributions resulting from each of these three methods and see which has placed the most probability density upon the true value of u, with this method being declared the most accurate (Figure 4 , pertaining to the financial example, gives a graphical interpretation of this). Note that it does not matter which individual we consider the combined belief from the perspective of, that is, on the left-hand side of equation (9), we could set i equal to any of the set f1, . . . , ng where n is the number of DMs in the neighbourhood, as the combined belief constructed by all DMs is common. The difference arises in the choices they make with these common distributions, which will be determined by their respective, potentially varying, probability distributions. However, this study concerns the accuracy of the PI distribution, so we focus solely on the evolving distributions of individuals, rather than the decisions which they make with these.
In Figure 1 , we provide an illustration of the results that occur from our simulation study of the normal overestimation case. We see that having only seen a single return, the MR approach does better than the PI approach irrespective of the number of DMs inherent within the problem. Having witnessed two returns, we observe that the PI approach now gives the better estimation for 10 or more DMs, while for three returns it is better for seven or more DMs. It is evident that the more information sources an individual has access to the better the performance of the PI approach will be. We can also note that as the number of returns witnessed grows, the performance of the PI method Table 1 . True data generating mechanisms, parameter values, prior structures and the distributions governing the simulation of prior parameters for DMs, as well as the corresponding average means resulting from these.
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becomes increasingly dominant. This is intuitive, as the PI approach is a methodology that learns over time, gaining increasingly accurate measures of the reliability of individual DMs in accordance with an increased amount of data. These conclusions are reinforced by the success proportions given in Table 2 . Here we observe that the amount of times (out of the 5000 simulations in each case) that the PI approach outperforms the two alternatives is steadily increasing as the number of participants increases, with the other two approaches success proportions decreasing accordingly. We can also see that the success proportions for the PI approach for a given number of DMs are higher having seen four returns than three returns. We provide graphs analogous to that in Figure 1 for the eight other cases (binomial underestimation, Poisson underestimation, etc.) in Figure 2 . We can see that essentially identical conclusions can be inferred from these as well, with the PI approach's power growing both in accordance with the number of DMs involved in the problem and also the amount of data which has been witnessed. We also see performance of the PI approach is marginally weaker in the (a priori more accurate) underestimation case than the overestimation case, but that performance actually improves when the average predictions are mean-centred. Briefly, we comment on the poor performance of the EQ approach. In only one of the cases considered (two DMs and one return in the binomial mean-centred scenario) does it outperform the two alternatives. The opinions of accurate individuals are being sabotaged by those of inaccurate individuals, with a performance-based weighting scheme (be it the PI method or the MR method) giving substantially more accurate estimation than the simple scheme. We also compare the accuracy of the PI posterior distribution to the posteriors of individuals. It seems clear that given a reasonable amount of DMs and returns, the PI approach is superior to the two other linear opinion pooling methods considered, but we have not yet discussed if DMs would be best served by heeding solely their own distributions, and ignoring the additional information proffered by those around them. We conducted a similar simulation study to that discussed above to try to answer this question, using the nine distributional initialisations previously introduced. For each simulation, we considered the probability density that was placed on the true parameter Figure 1 . Plot of which method has the highest success proportion in the normal overestimation case, for a varying amount of DMs and returns. Empty circles denote the instances when the MR method is superior, with filled squares for those in which the PI approach is, and filled triangles for those in which the EQ approach is none of which are evident in this instance. The number of returns seen is on the x-axis and the number of DMs is on the y-axis.
value by the PI posterior and by individuals posteriors. We declared the PI approach to be superior if it placed more density on this value than more than half of the individual posteriors (note that a tie can occur if there is an even amount of DMs in the group). If this is the case, then it can be argued it is in the best interests of DMs to use this combined posterior, as with probability greater than 0.5 it will lead to more accurate estimation than their own distribution. Note that DMs do not know, a priori, how accurate they themselves are. For each case, we aggregated our results across the 5000 simulations conducted and saw if the PI approach was superior or not, by the metric described above. We discovered that in the case of the problem only having two participants, the PI approach will lead to more accurate estimation for the less accurate DM, and less accurate estimation for the more accurate DM, that is, the probability is exactly 0.5 of benefitting from the pooling of opinions. In all other cases, the PI approach was superior to individuals own distributions, implying that it was meritorious to use this combined belief. We include an illustration of the success proportions for the normal overestimation case in Table 3 , after three and four returns have been witnessed. First, we can observe that there is a decrease in the PI approach success proportion over time. This is to be expected. As individuals witness more data, they themselves will become increasingly accurate and be less dependent upon the views of accurate neighbours. Note that as previously mentioned, ties are possible in cases with an even number of DMs, and hence, we tend to observe slightly lower success proportions in even cases than in odd cases, particularly for small numbers of DMs. In general, the success proportion remains relatively constant as the number of individuals increases. We can concur that there is doubtlessly merit in DMs using the combined distribution in place of their own, as well as in place of the two alternative linear opinion pooling methods previously discussed.
Example
Consider a setting with five DMs, P 1 , . . . , P 5 . Each has her own beliefs about the true value of u, which is a latent parameter pertaining to stock performance, and hence the profit or loss resulting from the decision made. Each individual must decide whether to enter into a long forward on the stock (d 1 ) or not (d 2 ). Entering into a long forward involves agreeing to buy a stock at a fixed time (known as the expiry time) in the future for a fixed price, called the strike price. If the strike price exceeds the actual value of the stock at the fixed future time, then the DM has made a loss (as they are buying the stock for more than it is worth), if not then they have made a profit. In the myopic scenario considered here, DMs must decide whether to enter into the long forward or not, at a succession of decision epochs. There is an obvious risk inherent within this problem, as DMs do not know if they will make a profit or a loss in each individual trade they enter into. We assume that beliefs over u are normally distributed with unknown mean and known variance. This is done for convenience (as previously discussed) via normal-normal conjugacy. Let u;N(m, 2). Here, we assume that this unknown mean has true value of 22, that is, on average DMs will make a loss. Participants have prior beliefs over this unknown mean m, which themselves can be modelled by normal distributions. The prior beliefs of P i over m are represented by f i (m);N(m i , s 2 i ). The decision participants make over whether to enter the long forward (potentially making a monetary gain but also potentially making a monetary loss) or not (ensuring no monetary gain and no monetary loss) are heavily influenced by their utility functions, expressing their attitudes towards risks and gambles, and the initial fortune (g i ) which they begin with. Their opinions about u, utility functions, and starting fortunes are given in Table 4 .
In this example, we contrast the decisions that would be made by DMs using the PI approach and by the same DMs if they were simply heeding solely their own opinion.
We also compare what decision they would deem optimal using the EQ and MR method. Note that the three linear poolings are initialised by the Laplacian Principle of Indifference at the first epoch, so will yield identical distributions (and hence results) in each case. The decisions deemed optimal are given on the left-hand side of Table 5 . We can see that under the PI approach (and hence under the other two linear pooling methods), all DMs opt to enter into the long forward, while only P 1 , who is confident that a loss will be made, would not enter into the transaction when listening only to her own opinions.
Upon entering the long forward, all individuals make a loss of $1.30, that is, r = À1:3 (with this value here simulated from the true distribution of u). They now update their beliefs in light of this new evidence and combine their augmented opinions. The weights, both PI and normalised, associated with each participant by each of the methods are given in Table 6 . A graphical interpretation of where these weights come from is included in Figure 3 . We can see that the DM deemed most accurate (i.e. having the largest PI weight) was P 2 , meaning she is the sole individual whose view is considered in the MR method. She has the highest weight in the PI approach, but the opinions of others are still taken into account, with her opinion having a (non-dominant) weight of 0.4763. As we can see from the right-hand side of Table 5 , no DM using the PI approach opts to enter into the long forward, while P 3 , P 4 and P 5 all would if they listened only to their own beliefs. Using the EQ approach would lead all DMs to enter into the transaction, while the MR method leads, in this case, to the same outcome as the PI approach (although as we can see from Table 6 , the PI estimate is closer to the true value than that resulting from the MR method, albeit with a larger variance).
The decision process has stopped as no individual enters into a long forward at the second epoch, and hence, no new return can be observed, and beliefs updated in light of this. We can see the clear advantage of using the PI approach in this example, as individuals who made their decisions without acknowledging the beliefs of those around them would continue to enter into long forwards (and quite possibly make losses), while those using the linear pooling technique would have stopped (and hence prevented future losses). Figure 4 highlights the predictive ability of the various methods, showing that it is the PI posterior which places the most probability density on the true parameter value. Similarly, Figure 5 contrasts the PI distribution with the posteriors of the five individuals, revealing that the PI method leads to more accurate estimation (in terms of probability density) for four of the five DMs. Hence, it is in the best interest of individuals to use this combined distribution, as with probability of 0.8 (i.e. with probability over 0.5), it will lead to better estimation than their own.
For illustration, in Table 7 , we illustrate the success proportions of the three competing linear opinion pooling (based on 5000 simulations) using the prior beliefs specified in Table 4 and the normal data generating mechanism. We see, as alluded to previously, that the PI approach becomes increasingly successful as the number of returns witnessed increases. 
DM: decision maker; PI: plug-in; EQ: equal weights.
Here d Ã denotes the optimal decision for a DM listening solely to her own belief, with d Ã PI , d Ã EQ and d Ã MR representing the optimal decision for a DM using the PI, EQ and MR approaches, respectively. 
Possible alternatives
Perhaps, a criticism that could be levelled at the PI approach (although it could equally be argued as a strength) is its objectivity. It is not susceptible to biases and does not incorporate personalistic elements of users into its procedure. Briefly, here we discuss two methodologies that we have developed which are capable of assimilating subjective information from those who use it. The first of these begins with the assumption that a DM will often be biased towards her own belief, and hence may not wish to initially apply the Principle of Indifference. They may frequently be inclined to give a high weight to those neighbours who have beliefs similar to their own. We measure the similarity between two probability distributions by the Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence, 43 although this idea extends naturally to the use of any alternative dissimilarity measure, for instance x 2 distance, variational distance and total variation distance (all of which are discussed in Cover and Thomas). 44 An individual P i first chooses the weight, a i, i , she wishes to allocate to her own beliefs (which may in the extreme cases be 1 if she wishes to disregard totally the opinions of others, or 0 if she wishes for her own opinion to have no input into the process) and then constructs the weights assigned to her neighbours using the inverse of the KL distance between their beliefs and her own, that is
Here, individuals with beliefs similar to P i will be considered reliable and will hence return a low KL value, leading to a high weight. This KL method is clearly not guaranteed to lead to a high decision quality, but it may model the manner in which individuals actually make decisions.
Alternatively, we note that decision making is built upon two fundamental pillars, probability and utility, and indeed, these concepts can be viewed as 'twinned' (as discussed in French 45 ). The final method that we consider incorporates the utility functions of the participants in an attempt to increase the procedure's subjectivity. DMs make their first decision, d Ã , in a manner identical to that of the PI approach, that is, using equal weights. They then observe some return and update their own distributions in light of this. Each individual considers the expected utility she would have assigned to the decision she made at the first epoch, had she solely listened to the beliefs of each neighbour P j in turn, for j = 1, . . . , n. We write this value as
This is similar to equation (5), but with the combined belieff i (u) of P i being replaced by the individual belief f j (u) of P j . Having done this P i calculates the absolute value of the difference between the utility that actually resulted from the decision d Ã and E ijj ½u i (d Ã ), written
This gives a measure of the difference between the utility that actually occurred from d Ã and the expected utility of d Ã under the beliefs of P j . A small value of this quantity indicates that there is little disparity between what occurred and what P j predicted would occur, with a large value indicating the contrary. Hence, this can be viewed as a reliability measure, with a small d i, j signifying that P j is an accurate source of information to P i , and a large value signifying the opposite. Hence, updated weights are given by
Note that this updating scheme is invariant to positive linear transformations of the utility function of the user, a clearly desirable property. The introduction of the utility function is an important step as it allows an increased subjectivity to enter the procedure. Different neighbours will respond differently to the distribution f j (u) depending on their own feelings towards risk. A risk-averse DM may think more highly of the conservative views of a neighbour than a very risk-prone DM Figure 5 . Plots of the individual posterior distributions of DMs, and the posterior distribution resulting from the PI method, with the vertical line denoting the true value of u = À2. for instance. It is an area of further research to investigate the merits of this differing viewpoints approach, as well as the KL method, in a manner akin to the justification discussed within this article for the use of the PI approach.
Conclusion and further work
In this article, we have discussed how information can be pooled between a set of DMs who must each make a decision, the consequences of which will solely impinge upon themselves, irrespective of their severity (positive or negative). However, what about a fully group setting, in which the participating DMs must make a single decision, the outcome of which will effect all of them equally? We have seen above how a decisionmaking task requires two fundamental tools, namely a utility function and a probability distribution. In equation (5), we saw how for a single individual P i , this was calculated using her own utility function u i (r) and the combined belieff i (u). This methodology could be implemented in a fully group problem, using a combined belief for the group (denoted byf(u) say) and an amalgamated utility function (written as u(r)) which constituted elements of the willingness to take gambles and risks for all participants. In this case, the combined belief could be found using the (highly objective) PI approach. How this group utility function u(r) would be constructed is a matter of debate itself, although we favour a method similar to the utilitarian framework justified in Harsanyi. 46 We note that any such group decision-making task must be considered in light of Arrow's impossibility theorem. 47 In our introduction, we referenced how in what followed we would use the (common) assumption that individuals could quantify their uncertainty via a fully parameterised probability distribution. The Bayes linear method 6 was discussed as one method by which this assumption could be weakened, in which DMs need only specify the first two moments of their belief. We are interested in developing an even more basic scenario, in which individuals supply non-parametric predictive intervals which they believe the true parameter value lies within, for example, that the probability of a head occurring in a coin toss is in the range ½0:3, 0:7. Preliminary work has been carried out regarding this line of belief specification, using the updating rules of nonparametric predictive utility inference 37 and expectation as the primitive construct rather than probability (as discussed in, for instance, De Finetti 48 and Whittle 49 ).
In this article, we have attempted to justify the PI approach by discussion of some desirable rationality criteria that it obeys, as well as by illustrating its performance in contrasts to that of some common considered benchmarks using simulated data. Previously, we have mentioned the work of Clemen and Goossens 21 and Eggstaff et al. 23 in validating the classical method of Cooke 3 by the use of a collection of real-world data sets, which span a wide variety of domains. Ideally, we would provide further justification for the PI approach using these data. Yet, there are many contrasts between our method/the data it requires and the classical method/the data it requires. The classical method assumes the existence of relevant prior information (i.e. seed variables), while the PI method does not. In addition to this, individuals supply opinions via fully parameterised probability distributions in the PI distribution, while they only are required to submit quantiles over the uncertain quantity in the classical method. However, most importantly, the PI approach involves weights being updated only in light of noisy realisations of some random variable of interest (which are witnessed as results of decisions made), while in the classical approach the seeds considered are distinct random variables, the realisations of which are their precise true value. This contrast makes it hard to validly assess the PI approach using this data set, and hence, an area for further work is to find a suitable data set for justification.
Finally, a more general direction for future work is to extend the existing methodology to cope with a dynamic parameter u, that is, one which is constantly evolving over time. For simplicity, we have assumed staticness here, but introduction of this additional complexity could lead to more accurate modelling of realistic phenomena.
